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Remote Sprint Launch Sites > RSL HAER Info > RLOB Description: Interior

RLOB Description: Interior

(Excerpt from Historic American Engineering Record, HAER No. Part II. Architectural Information

C. Description of Interior

1. Floor Plans:

The RLOB's have approximately 11,956 ft2 of gross floor area. Some 15 percent of the area was EMP/RFI shielded in order to protect sensitive equipment.

The roof and floors were designed as either flat, one-way, or two-way slabs to carry vertical loads. In addition, they were designed as diaphragms to transfer lateral loads to the shear walls.

a. Main Level:

The main level contains equipment rooms (including the SRCE room (Sprint Remote Control Equipment)), cable vaults, vestibules, corridors, personnel areas, Chemical, Bacteriological, and Radiological (CBR) filter rooms, power and battery rooms, a Security Operations Control Console (SOCC) room, a fan room, and a crypto room.

b. Upper Level:

The upper level contains a storage room and a fan room.

2. Flooring:

The floor finish for the RLOB's was as follows: epoxy over concrete (16 rooms); concrete floor hardener (13 rooms); vinyl asbestos tile (VAT) (5 rooms); VAT on shock isolated platforms and painted liner plate (communication and crypto rooms); and VAT on removable panels (SRCE room (Sprint Remote Control Equipment)).

3. Wall and Ceiling Finish:

Each RLOB room, corridor, and separate enclosure was individually lined with 11-gauge steel liner plate to avoid compromising the structural integrity of junctions between interior floors, walls, and columns and the exterior walls, roof, and floor slabs. The RLOB wall finish was as follows: exposed concrete (22 rooms); concrete with gypboard (6 rooms); liner plate (6 rooms); and acoustical treatment (2 rooms).

The RLOB ceiling finish was as follows: exposed concrete (24 rooms); acoustical lay-in panel (7 rooms); and liner plate (6 rooms).

4. Openings:

Apertures resulting from utilities and other systems entering the RLOB were possible sources of contamination and required preventive measures. All conduits and ducts entering the RFI shielded areas were equipped with filters designed to attenuate RFI.

a. Doors:

Each RLOB has 7 shielded doors. Doors in interior walls between rooms within the same EMP/RFI shielding zone were conventional. Doors in walls separating or bounding EMP/RFI shielding zones were provided with a sheet steel jacket and conductive gaskets or metal finger stock around the perimeter to assure electrical continuity with the door casing, which was seal-welded to the liner plate. Each door is a hinged recessed contact mechanism type; Door 101 is a double door, whereas doors 102, 103, 105, 108, 108A, and 125 are all single doors.

5. Mechanical Equipment:

As in the Missile Site Control Building (MSCB) and Perimeter Acquisition Radar Building (PARB), sensitive technical and support equipment was protected from the potential nuclear shock environment through the use of shock isolation platforms.

All anchorage for equipment cable trays, duct work, and cabinets was attached directly to steel bearing plates which were embedded in the concrete and continuously welded to the steel liner plate to maintain shielding integrity.

In addition to missile control equipment, each RLOB had logic-to-relay converters and other equipment to provide a communications link between the MSCB, the RLOB's, and the Sprint missile farms.

Also unique to the RSL sites was the method for protecting critical utilities and systems:

It was not economical to concentrate the lines in one location and use a corrugated structure such as was utilized at the PAR and MSR facilities. A low compressive strength (6 psi) foam insulation was placed around individual lines and groups of lines which, in turn, was protected from normal soil pressures with a layer of higher strength foam insulation. Expansion joints were utilized in the lines inside the foam jacket, where required, to withstand longitudinal forces.

a. Communications:

Communications between the RSL sites were routed through the MSCB and provided by the Safeguard Communications Agency (SAFCA).

b. Electrical:

Under normal conditions, a commercial substation supplied power for the RSL sites, but during attack/alert conditions or power outages, power would be supplied via gas turbine generators located within the RLOB. During attack, combustion air for these turbines would be provided through an extensive air filtering/scrubbing system and uninterruptable or "no-break" power (both 208 and 460 volts) for mission critical loads provided through a rectifier/battery/motor-generator system, with battery storage capacity of 4 to 6 minutes.

c. Heating, Air Conditioning, Ventilation:

Nine main electric duct heaters supported the RLOB: two 154,000 BTUH; four 10,240 BTUH; one 3,413 BTUH; one 5,120 BTUH; and one 13,700 BTUH. There were also various air handling units available, including one in Room 100A (7,000 CFM with a 78,500 BTUH heating coil) and one in Room 100B (7,000 CFM with a 78,500 BTUH heating coil).

There were seven main air handling units: two 6,600 CFM; two 7,000 CFM; two 17,000 CFM; and one 6,000 CFM. The following air handling units were also for indirect expansion air conditioning: Room 100A (7,000 CFM with a 216,000 BTUH cooling coil); Room 100B (7,000 CFM with a 216,000 BTUH cooling coil); Room 200A (7,400 CFM with a 218,000 BTUH cooling coil); Room 200B (7,400 CFM with a 218,000 BTUH cooling coil); Room 300A (18,000 CFM with a 270,000 BTUH cooling coil); and Room 300B (18,000 CFM with a 270,000 BTUH cooling coil).

The RLOB's contain three exhaust fans and two supply fans, as follows: exhaust - toilet (300 CFM); battery room (400 CFM); decontamination room (500 CFM); and supply - CBR filter room (two at 2,300 CFM).

d. Lighting:

Lighting surrounded the Sprint field mound and the exclusion and limited areas; these were lit during periods of darkness by commercial lamps mounted on poles.

e. Plumbing:

At RSL 1, 2, and 4, two underground steel tanks with a capacity of 27,500 gal each (approximately a 2 week supply) held water brought to the site by truck; there was no surface water present.

The water storage tank fill was located adjacent to the Limited Area Sentry Station (LASS); water was distributed from the tanks to the water treatment equipment located in the respective RLOB's. Waterlines included surge arresters to prevent equipment damage.

The water system at RSL 3 was unique to that site. The Senator Young Dam intake provided water to RSL 3 via a pump station (Building 5401); it maintained an authorized pumping rate of 10 gal per minute. Water was stored in two 27,500 gallon underground steel tanks.

f. Grounding and Cathodic Protection System

In order to counter electrical surges from a nuclear blast, a grid constructed of steel conductors 16 by 16 ft on centers and welded at each connection was buried some 1.5 ft underground. Known as a grounding counterpoise, the grid had 10-foot-long steel rods, spaced 16 ft apart, connected to it and driven into the ground at its perimeter. Welded to the grid at intervals of 32 ft were magnesium sacrificial anodes, which provided cathodic protection. The RSL buildings, fences, tanks, conduits, and pipes were connected to the counterpoise. Electrical activity could be measured by means of reference test stations composed of a meter and an underground probe. (See comment from Joseph Hullender regarding the cathodic protection system. He is apparently referring to the MSR rather than the RLOB installations.)